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OUR DIRECTOR who represents the AmericanStatistical Asso-
ciation recalled, in his presidential address last December, the
imperative need for economic statistics felt by the War Boards
in 1917-18 and the paucity of the supply. Many mattersthat
should have been known had to be guessed at, and new agencies
had to be set up in a hurry to collect data that industriesfound
difficulty in providing amidst the rush of war work. Mr.Riefler
then dwelt upon the great impetus this hard lesson gave to
statisticsafter the war, and the benefits the country is now de-
riving from more thorough acquaintance with its ownaffairs.
Most of the founders of the National Bureau had partici-
pated during the earlier World War in the desperate scramble
for quantitative knowledge of requirements and supplies,
prices and wages, industrial equipment and delivery schedules,
taxable incomes and family consumption, costs of production
and shipping facilities. Personal experience led them to believe
that realistic study of economic activities on a quantitative basis
is no less essential in peace than in war. Our Bureau is thus one
of the agencies for public service that grew out of the troubles
Mr. Riefler mentioned. That is not less true because it was a
product of private initiative, supported by public-spirited citi-
zens, and designed to conductscientific research rather than to
meet the administrative needs of government.
Now that the country is caught in a new war vastly greater
in its economic demands than the war of 1917-18, what the
National Bureau has done since 1920 is proving its worth in
many ways. Again our government isseeking to mobilize all
the country's resources as quickly as possible to achieve victory,
and again those who direct the undertaking must find out what
goods can be delivered in what quantities at what places, within
what time, and what civilian activities it is necessary to main-
tam. The knowledge required for this purpose is staggering in
9volume and bewildering in detail. By no means all the data
wanted by the new war agencies and the old departments can
be had, and many estimates are perforce being hazarded. But,
as Mr. Riefler pointed out, our present administrators arc much
better off than were their predecessors a quarter of a century
ago, thanks to the progress of research since i 918. That the
National Bureau has contributed a portion of the knowledge
now being put to use should gratify all associated with it, and
be a spur to future efforts.
WAR USES OF ECONOMIC FINDINGS
Amidst the huge mass of economic data applied to guide the
war effort, estimates of national income are basic. President
Roosevelt has summed up the country's call upon all its people
by saying that more than half of the expected national income
must be devoted to the winning of victory. Thanks to fuller
knowledge accumulated from research, the government can
determine broadly how many billions can be appropriated to
the armed services and how this diversion will affect civilian
consumption. The breakdown of the totals by size of income,
despite its imperfections, is used in drafting tax legislation.
A breakdown by type of income helps to gauge what contribu-
tions can be expected from wage and salary earners, from profit
makers, and from recipients of dividends, interest, and rent.
Still another breakdown, by industrial source, indicates the
roles played by agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construc-
tion, transportation, trade, personal services, the professions,
and government itself in providing livelihoods for our people.
Having estimates of gross national product to compare with
the figures of national income, officials can approximate the
sums annually needed to offset depreciation, depletion, and
obsolescence. Estimates of consumers' incomes and expendi-
tures, in combination with studies of capital formation and con-
sumption, offer one means of estimating the savings that can
be borrowed by government or invested under private aus-
pices to pay-for new industrial equipment. If we had these fig-
ures for only a single year they would beuseful. They are far
more useful for being available over aconsiderable period. One
of the crucial problems is how the war will affect the size and
make-up of national income, and that complex question is best
approached by studying the changes in national income during
the past generation. Thinking in terms of national income has
become a habit among officials in Washington, and the habit is
spreading among the alert executives of business enterprises
throughout the country. Not only do estimates of national in-
come give government thebest basis we have for over-all
economic planning, whether in war or in peace, they also give
business men, investors, and labor leaders a basis for anticipat-
ing demands for commodities, capital, and labor so far as these
demands depend upon the condition of trade at large.
What is now known about this fundamental magnitude has
been learned in large part since the National Bureau was
founded, and in no small measure through its efforts. Our first
investigation, carried out by Messrs. King, Knauth, and Ma-
caulay, dealt with the size and distribution of the income of the
United States in 1909-18. Our staff has kept at this subject
ever since, carrying its estimates forward throughlater years
and improving upon the earlier figures by utilizing new sources
and by thinking through the intricate conceptual problems
encountered in such work. Some of our publications have been
highly technical and have had a correspondingly narrow ap-
peal. The justification of the long continued effort is now clear.
So also is the value of the collateral inquiries by Solomon Fabri-
cant into the capital currently formed and consumed. Most of
our substantive and conceptual results are summed up in
Simon Kuznets' National income and its Composition, 1919-
1938,released in January. C. Reinold Noyes, in reporting to
the American Economic Association, which he represents upon
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10 I IIour Board of Directors, said of this treatise: "The summation
of the author's years of work in the field presents, for the first
time so far as my knowledge goes, the fundamental analysis
of an economy in quantitative terms, sufficiently complete and
covering a period long enough to show the dynamic as well as
the static picture. It is an X-ray movie of the behavior of the
American economy during twenty momentous years."
The National Bureau feels the more satisfaction in this
accomplishment because other agencies and individuals not
members of its staff shared so largely in it. From the start we
received generous cooperation from many sources, public and
private. When the Conference on Research in Income and
Wealth was set up in 1936, this collabbration became wider
and more continuous. In 1933 the Department of Commerce
took over the preparation of annual estimates of national in-
come, first in response to a Senate resolution, then as a regular
feature of its statistical reporting. To get the work started, the
government borrowed Mr. Kuznets for a year as its chief in-
vestigator. In two papers presented to the American Economic
and Statistical Associations in December he rendered another
service by focusing his investigations upon two pressing prob-
lems: (i) 'What effects a diversion to war uses of say half of
the national income is likely to have upon consumers' expendi-
tures, capital formation, and investments'; (2) 'What total
will national income probably reach and what will the taxable
capacity of the country be during the postwar decade?' The
first will appear as National Bureau Occasional Paper 6, while
the second will be published in the Proceedings of the A merican
EconomicAssociation.We believe that many uses will be found
also for the latest of our income studies, Harold Barger's
Income and Outlay, 1921-1938, which gives estimates of
national income by quarters instead of years, together with
certain components not hitherto covered in detail.
Other findings of the National Bureau that have been or are
being used by the government to meet the emergency come
from the Conferences on Price Research and Financial Re-
search. When it was planning to restrict installment selling as
one safeguard against price inflation, the Federal Reserve
Board relied heavily upon our eight studies of consumer financ-
ing. The Office of Price Administration has been utilizing some
of our price studies in its intricate and responsible task of estab-
lishing price 'controls'. More at large, what has been learned
since the 1914—I 8 war by the National Bureau and other agen-
cies about secular, cyclical, seasonal, structural, and random
movements helps governmental and business statisticians to
draw sound conclusions from time series. The mutual relations
among economic activities have long been observed by practical
men and schematically expounded by economic theorists. Real-
istic research on the quantitative level, combining methodical
observation with explanatory hypotheses, has put a firmer
foundation under much that has been thought in the past,
added much to it, and vastly increased the practical value of
the whole.
WAR WORK BY STAFF MEMBERS AND COLLABORATORS
Not only is the government using National Bureau findings
extensively, it is taking many of our workers into its service.
The following men formerly on our payroll have resigned
or have been granted leaves of absence to enter the armed
forces, federal offices, or allied war work.
STAF F
SimonKuznets,WarProductionDavidRolbcin, Division of Civilian
Board . Supply
Milton Friedman, Treasury Depart-Frederick Strauss,Office of Price
ment A dminist ration
William H. Shaw, Department ofP. B. Nortman, Office of Price Ad-
Comni erce mm h/ration
Julius Shiskin, War Production BoardMarcus Jacobs, United States Army
Augustus Kelley, United States Army
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12 . 1 13BUSINESS-CYCLE COLLABORATORS The following mcii who have been collaborating on our re-
James W. AngclI, Division of Civil-Walt W. Rostow, Office of Cootli.. searches without salary from the National Bureau are now in
ian Supply flat or of Information governmental service.
Rollin F. Bennett, Division of CivilianSupply CONFERENCE ON PRICE RESEARCH
Arthur R. Burns, Civilian Allocation,D. H. Wallace, War Production CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN INCOME AND WEALTH
War Production Board Board
C. Lowell Harriss, Treasury Department M. G. de Chazeau, War ProductionR. H. Whitman, War Production
Board Board
CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN FISCAL POLICY Joel Dean, Office of Price Administration
Rcynold E.Carison, Division ofEugene Oakcs,TreasuryDepait-
Civilian Supply menu CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN FISCAL POLICY
JohnFcnnclly,War ProductionKcnyon Poole, Treasury Department Randolph Paul, Treasury DepartmentJacob Viner, Treasury Department
Board Dan T. Smith, Army Procurement - KeithButters, Office of Price Administration
Gabriel Hauge, Naval Reserve
-
FINANCIALRESEARCH PROGRAM
FINANCIAL RESEARCH PROGRAM Winfield W. Richer, Board of Economic Warfare
Richard Berger, Office of Price Ad-S. Grant Saunders, Defense Contract
ministration Work We may note also that President Roosevelt's Fact-finding
Stanley Miller, Office of Price Administration Board, appointed to study the wages of railway employees,
borrowed for a month or more the services of Arthur F. Burns,
The following men now on our payrollare acting as part-time Thor Hultgren, and Gerald J. Fischer of our business-cycle
consultants of governmental agencies.
I staff.Probably more of our co-workers will be called upon to
STAFF serve the government in months to come. It is the National
Bureau's privilege and policy to do all that it can to facilitate Moses Abramovitz, Office of Price Administration
I
suchshifts.
CONFERENCE ON PRICE RESEARCH We do not expect, however, that these transfers of our co-
E. S. Mason, Office of Coordinator of Information workers to public service will or should put a stop to our own
researches. For reasons set forth below, we believe that the
CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN FISCAL POLICY National Bureau can serve the country best by continuing to
Lawrence Seltzer, Treasury Department work upon economic issues fundamental to the common wel-
fare. A considerable part of our staff is still intact, and we can
FINANCIAL RESEARCH PROGRAM obtain qualified recruits who, for one reason or another, are
Sidney Alexander, Office of PriceWalter Chudnowsky, Office of Price not available for federal employment. What the country will
Administration Administration need that the National Bureau can help to supply, and what
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following pages.
POSTWAR NEEDS FOR ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE
One respect in which the economic mobilization of 1941—42
differs from that of 1917-18isthat more thought is being
given to the difficulties that will attend the return to peace.
This foresighted attitude must be credited in part to recollec-
tions of the troubles into which the nation fell in 1920-2 I, in
part to the, nightmare of the Great Depression in 1929-33, and
in part to our uncertain relation to the war before December 7.
• So long as the country was thinking in terms of national de-
fense, thost government agencies and many private enterprises
took time to look ahead and consider how current policies would
affect postwar conditions. How prevalent this attitude was last
October is demonstrated by A Survey of Institutional Research
on American Postwar Problems, prepared by George B. Gallo-
way and issued in mimeographed form by the Twentieth Cen-
tury Fund.* There is some evidence that the sudden plunge
into a 'shooting war', and the gravity of the military-naval
problems facing the country, have already diminished the
attention paid to the future. That change is natural. But it will
be a dire misfortune if no thought is given during the war to
ways and means of coping with the problems that will confront
us as soon as peace is made. Fortunately, there seems slight
danger that this error will be committed. Certainly, the
National Bureau should be ready to aid in reconstruction no
less than it is ready to aid in the war.
An organization that hopes to render future service to pub-
lic welfare is forced to peer -into coming years, however low
the visibility may be. For it cannot lay its plans wisely except
as it anticipates future needs. The following paragraphs are
not a presumptuous excursion into prophecy on the part of a
Arevisededition is in courseof publication.
'fact-finding' agency, but an essential feature of its planning
for research. Some chart of the future the National Bureau
must draw for its own guidance amidst the bewildering uncer-
tainties of today. That is, we should try to descry as best we
may the least improbable line of developments, and arrange
our work-now to provide what we can of the economic knowl-
edge our sketch suggests will be wanted after the war.
What the National Bureau should attempt to learn cannot
be foreseen in detail; for we do not know how long it will take
to win victory, in what condition our domestic affairs will be at
that uncertain date, or what form international relations will
assume. But of a few fundamentals we can be sure. The pri-
mary economic processes of producing and distributing the
goods that constitute real income will go on. Men will not give
up the manifest advantages of division of labor or of modern
technology. That will entail the training of workers for innu-
merable tasks, many of them requiring advanced education. It
means also demand for industrial equipment on a large scale;
that is, for capital and for saving. Services must be exchanged
for commodities, and different commodities and services for
one another, on a scale not less elaborate than we practice today.
For that purpose money of some sort will be indispensable, and
somehow prices must be determined. Somebody must bear the
risks of present investment for future production. Since men
must trust one another in their economic dealings over time,
credit in some form will play a role. These essential processes
must be organized in some way that will enable men to pro-
duce goods for others in confidence that others will supply
what they want.
What form this organization will assume is one of the chief
uncertainties. But earlier experiences of return from war to
peace, coupled with knowledge of what is going on today, and
will probably go on in more stringent fashion as we get deeper
into the war, suggests certain probabilities. Civilian consump-
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r6 1 '7tion of many goods will be curtailed during the war, especially
the consumption of luxuries and of durable commodities that
can be made to serve longer than is agreeable. A huge demand
will accumulate for consumers' goods of many types—a de-
mand that our people will be eager to satisfy when the war
ends. The transition from war to peace will require a vast
expenditure upon reconverting the 'arsenal of democracy' into
a plant for serving life instead of death. That expenditure may
be comparable with the current outlays for transition from
peace to war. Also current maintenance of industrial equipment
will have been neglected in many instances; repairs, renewals,
and replacements will be needed on a large scale. Thus the huge
demand for consumers' goods will be supplemented by a huge
demand for producers' goods. The like will be true in more
extreme degree of our major allies, and probably in a degree
yet more extreme of our present enemies. It is further probable
that, however cheerfully our people bear the burdens of war,
they will become restive under regimentation, and eager to
throw off restrictions as soon as the emergency is over. An irre-
sistible urge to resume customary activities gripped men of
affairs after the Armistice of 1918 and is likely to grip them
again. The thousands of business men now aiding in the eco-
nomic mobilization will be eager to get back to their own affairs
in time to profit by the promising market. Millions in the army,
navy, and air forces, or working under high pressure on gov-
ernment contracts will welcome release.
Of course, one can imagine a very different outcome 'of the
war. Defeat and subjection to foreign domination has no place
in our reckoning. But perhaps peace will be signed on terms
that preclude general demobilization. Or the struggle may be
so long and so hard as to bring about profound changes in our
political and economic institutions. After the war of 1914-18,
one country on the winning side as well as several countries that
suffered defeat underwent a domestic revolution. Some such
fate' may be in store for the United States. But our history has
been one of evolutionary changes by constitutional methods.
To suppose that a large proportion of our people will lose
confidence in the institutions they are fighting to defend and
demand a radical change seems less reasonable than to suppose
that they will adapt their traditional methods to varying cir-
cumstances in their wonted fashion. The assumption here
chosen as the least unlikely is merely that the alterations
brought about by the war will not abolish business enterprise
under common rules and regulations prescribed by a demo-
cratically chosen government, and that at least a large part of
the enlisted men, munitions workers, and federal officials will
return to civilian pursuits.
If this forecast is not wholly wrong, the year or two after
peace has been established will see the American peopletrying
to resume their old way of life under their accustomed formof
economic organization. No one thinks that can
be a complete return to the status quo ante: conditions in this
country and abroad will have altered too much for that. But
our former scheme of organization was flexible and couldbe
adapted to a wide range of circumstances. Probably most Amer-
icans will have a happy confidence that they can make their
livings again much as they made them in prewar days.
Doubtless there will be some months of dislocation accom-
panied by declining activity after the next armistice as there was
after November 1918. How long this phase will last no one
knows. The National Bureau's studies in business cycles indi-
cate that the peak of activity during the preceding war came in
August 1918, and that the subsequent decline lasted only eight
months. A longer duration may now be expected on the sup-
position that a larger portion of our energies will be drawn into
the war effort and kept there longer. If so, readjustment will
be a more formidable task and may take more time. But, ac-
cording to our chronology of business cycles, the contraction of
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the consumption of luxuries and of durable commodities that
can be made to serve longer than is agreeable. A huge demand
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If this forecast is not wholly wrong, the year or two after
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economic organization. No one thinks that can
be a complete return to the status quo ante: conditions in this
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icans will have a happy confidence that they can make their
livings again much as they made them in prewar days.
Doubtless there will be some months of dislocation accom-
panied by declining activity after the next armistice as there was
after November 1918. How long this phase will last no one
knows. The National Bureau's studies in business cycles indi-
cate that the peak of activity during the preceding war came in
August 1918, and that the subsequent decline lasted only eight
months. A longer duration may now be expected on the sup-
position that a larger portion of our energies will be drawn into
the war effort and kept there longer. If so, readjustment will
be a more formidable task and may take more time. But, ac-
cording to our chronology of business cycles, the contraction of
i8 I 191918-19 lasted only six months in Great Britain and tenmonths
in France. It seems pessimistic beyond the demands ofpru-
dence to expect that our presentwar will last much more than
four years, absorb relativelymore of our strength than Great
Britain and France expended in their life and deathstruggle
with Germany, and leaveus less able to recuperate than they
were in '919. Nor is it likely that revival will long be held
back by lack of buyingpower. Demobilization is accompanied
by a lavish outpouring of public funds; millions ofwar workers
steadily employed formany months at high wages accumulate
in the aggregate huge cashreserves; some billions in small
government bonds can be turned into money if theowners want
additional funds; presumablyconsumer installment credit will
expand vigorously as soonas restrictions are removed. Given a
general desire to make up for the forced economiesof war, it
seems reasonable to expect that a great spending campaign will•
start a few months after the close of hostilities. Butat best this
expectation has a shaky foundation—the probabilitythat what
we have done before under the conditions produced bya major
war we shall do again under conditions that bid fair to resemble
those prevailing in 1918-19, in certain salient features.
How long the expansion initiated by thisdevelopment will
run is even more uncertain. Much will dependupon the degree
in which war has impoverished mankind,the attitude toward
government it has engendered, our relations with otherna-
tions, and the feasibility of financing the latter'spostwar needs.
Nor can we foresee how wellor ill we shall make our tradi-
tional mixture of private enterprise andgovernmental inter-
vention work under postwar conditions,or with what changes in
the mixture of these two ingredientswe shall experiment.
However these matters turnout, the real test of our economic
organization is likely tocome, not immediately after the war
but during the years whenwe are trying to resume 'business as
usual'. That will be the time whenwe shall need most sorely
all the economic wisdom we can muster. For the economic prob-
lenis of peace are really harder than those of war—harder
partly because we do not see them so clearly as matters of
national concern.
THESE POSTWAR NEEDS
AND THE NATIONAL BUREAU'S PROGRAM
Taking the preceding guess as the best we can make at present,
what modifications are called for in the National Bureau's
program?
So far as the United States preserves the pattern of economic
organization it had evolved before the war, what can be learned
from the past will continue to be the safest guide to the future.
Analysis should reveal both the weak and the strong points in
our complex of institutions. Those who seek to effect changes
and those who seek to conserve the old will appeal to failings
and successes in support of their contentions. Few advocates or
opponents of specific measures will have the time, patience,
technical equipment, and objectivity required to study thor-
oughly the lessons experience has to teach. Those who project
plans never tried before will base their speculations upon as-
explicit or tacit, concerning resources and human
behavior. The validity of these assumptions must be checked
by realistic inquiry before the trustworthiness of condusions
drawn from them can be judged. There will, therefore, be
more need than ever in the postwar world for thorough re-
search under controls that guard against bias.
This outlook demands a program of research focused upon
fundamental economic activities and their relations one to an-
other. Whatever specific conditions confront the country, and
whatever changes in economic organization are proposed, we
must take account of such matters as how production and prices
interact; the interrelations among wage rates, costs of produc-
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behavior. The validity of these assumptions must be checked
by realistic inquiry before the trustworthiness of condusions
drawn from them can be judged. There will, therefore, be
more need than ever in the postwar world for thorough re-
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This outlook demands a program of research focused upon
fundamental economic activities and their relations one to an-
other. Whatever specific conditions confront the country, and
whatever changes in economic organization are proposed, we
must take account of such matters as how production and prices
interact; the interrelations among wage rates, costs of produc-
tion, employment, payroll disbursements, the volume of con-surners' purchases and of investment; the bearing of our effi-
ciency as workers upon how much national income there is to
divide among us; the proportion of current output that must
be devoted to the upkeep of industrial equipment and the addi-
tional capital that must be invested if the nation is to increase
its real income; the economic effects of varying tax loads raised
in different ways; how public debts affect civilian welfare; the
ways and means of financing business enterprises, large and
small, through public or private agencies; our failures to ap-
proximate full employment of our resources, and the recurrent
expansions and contractions that have accompanied our eco-
nomic growth. In short, inquiries into the actual workings of
the American economy, such as the National Bureau has con-
ducted and is carrying further, promise to be applicable to the
fundamental economic issues the country will face when mili-
tary victory has been won.
We ought not to rest content, however, with a blanket reas-
surance that our current undertakings will continue to have
value. More searching self-examination is requisite to form
wise judgments regarding the allocation of our resources. That
is the aim of the following review of our program and the
suggestions for alterations in it.
The Business-Cycle Program
If we are right in thinking that the severest test of our eco-
nomic organization will come, not immediately after the peace,
but during the years when we shall be trying to resume our
wonted way of life, then the issue of maintaining approxi-
mately full employment of resources will reassert its crucial
importance.
For more than a decade the National Bureau has been work-
ing on that problem. Our line of attack has been based upon the
belief that it is well to know facts before explaining them or
adopting remedies for what is amiss. Much as the medical pro-
fession has found that close clinicalobservation of diseases is
prerequisite to successful treatment, so wehave thought that
careful examination of what happens inthe successive stages of
a businesscycle is necessary if we are to determinewhich of the
numerous hypothesesconcerning their causes have claim to
acceptance, and which,if any, of the numerous 'cures' now
advocated promise to give the bestresults in practice.
Acting on this view, we haveassembled a large collection of
time series that record thefluctuations in a wide variety of
economic activities. While Americanrecords of this type are
most adequate, we haveincluded British, French, and German
records,- because business cycles areinternational phenomena
and their course here is profoundlyinfluenced by their course in
countries with which the United Stateshas large commercial
and financial dealings. To get the mostfrom these records, we
have devised a method of measuringthe cyclical behavior of
time series that enables us to compareseries representing dif-
ferent activities, periods, and countrieswith respect to the
manner, regularity,timing, and amplitude of theirreactions
to the tides of expansionand contraction. The results already
in hand give a more accurate motionpicture than has been made
heretofore of the multiform readjustments amongdifferent
parts of the economy during abusiness cycle.
This clearer and fuller insight shouldbe put at the disposal
of officials, business men, labor organizations,and investors to
aid them in avoiding errors to which thefirst postwar expan-
sion will tempt all dasses—errorsof the sort committed in
19i9-zo leading to the drastic,though brief, depression of
I x, errors repeated on agrander scale in the late 192.0's
with still sorrier consequences.Thoughtful leaders in public
and private life will have the dangerof such an economic col-
lapse in mind, and in their efforts to avoid whathappened after
the preceding war many may be eager toavail themselves of
the lessons of experience as summed upin our findings.
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22 1 23Of course, the first postwar business cycle will run its course
under novel conditions, which will make it unique. But that
has been true of every business cycle in the historical record.
Our record exhibits the peculiarities characteristic of postwar
cycles as well as cycles under ordinary circumstances. To neg-
lect the teachings of experience because of strikingly novel
elements in the situation to be coped with would be no less
foolish than to assume that experience will repeat itself with-
out a change.
Our plans for carrying out the business-cycle program have
already been altered by the war, and we think further modifi-
cations desirable. As noted above, four of our collaborators
who have been working upon the cyclical behavior of prices,
inventories, foreign commerce, and banking are now devoting
part of or all their time to governmental work. That will delay,
how seriously we do not know, the completion of their parts of
the task. Also we have lost the help of five able assistant investi-
gators. Perhaps other shifts of staff to Washington will cause
more delays.
Nevertheless we contemplate a speeding up of publication.
Hitherto, it has been the practice of the National Bureau to
make an investigation as thorough and complete as our means
and personnel allow before releasing it. In view of the pressure
of the times, we feel justified in publishing results ata less
mature stage. Thus we plan to prepare as soon as possible an
Occasional Paper, perhaps a slender volume, presenting a sum-
mary of our tentative findings concerning the typical changes
that occur within the American economy during the successive
phases of cyclical expansion, recession, contraction, and revival
in business activity. Though many of the results may be modi-
fied in subsequent revisions, and though manygaps will later
be filled, prompt availability now seems more vital than the
perfecting and completing of details.
We should also like to prepare a brief monograph upon war
24
and postwar cycles. Our materials give a fragmentary outline
of American cycles in 186 1-67, 1867-70, and 1870-79. They
give a fuller picture of British cycles in 1914-19, 1919-21, and
1921-26; of French cycles in 1914-19, 1919-21,and 1921-25,
andof German cycles in 1914-19,1919-23, and 1923-26.
Moredetailed is thepicture of American cycles in 1914-19,
1919—21, and1921—24.Cursory examination of our measures
indicates that the several war cycles bear striking resemblances
to one another. In the first postwar cycles the resemblances are
still striking. The second postwar cycles are decidedly less
alike. Yet all have, the fundamental features of peacetime
cycles; some in wildly accentuated degree especially during
war, while other features are toned down. As is to be expected,
departures from peacetime characteristics become less notable
as the wars recede into the past. A summary of these earlier
effects of war and peace upon business fluctuations would cer-
tainly be interesting, and may prove highly valuable in the
years before us. To bring out the special features of the war
and postwar cycles more sharply, comparisons should be made
with the sketch of a typical cycle suggested in the preceding
paragraph.
Wage Rates and Prices
Leo Wolman's studies of wage rates, combined with other in-
formation about industries, exhibit clearly the relations be-
tween wage rates per hour or per piece, the annual incomes of
wage earners, and aggregate employment. These relationsrule
the fortunes of the millions of American families whose livings
come to them in pay envelopes. They are also of the greatest
consequence to the national income, of which wagesand sala-
ries make up nearly three-quarters. Business is equally con-
cerned, because the unit prices paid for labor rank high as a
factor in production costs, and because all business depends at
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25first or later remove upon the purchasing power of wage-
earning consumers, that is, upon their annual incomes.
This is one of the economic relations that will not be ren-
dered less fundamental by the war or by the return to peace. It
is also a relation frequently misconceived. All too often people
think of a rise in wage rates as assuring larger incomes and
higher living standards to the recipients, just as they too often
think of higher commodity prices as assuring larger profits to
producers. Both inferences are true if all other things remain
the same. But they prove disastrously untrue if the advance in
unit wages or prices is followed by a marked reduction in em-
ployment or sales. The danger that such reductions will occur
is obvious if wage rates or prices are pushed too high. What is
'too' high depends upon the relation of the rates and prices in
question to other parts of the price system. Even the best forti-
fied monopoly that has no competition in its special line must
remember that at least some customers have alternatives to
buying from it. Substitutes can be had for every commodity in
some of its uses; machinery can be designed, if worth while, to
perform part or all of most manual operations; consumption
of high priced goods can be restricted. More serious still, when
all price-charging parties seek to get the highest prices they
can extort from buyers, production is curtailed and national
income reduced. The outcome is general impoverishment, and
ultimate loss to those who sought gain at the expense of others.
Here lies, as is generally recognized, one of the most diffi-
cult problems of making 'capitalism' work in a society that
utilizes modern technology. For production of goods by intri-
cate industrial equipment requires large operating units, and
hence large business enterprises—though that is not the only
reason for their growth. The resulting conditions of employ-
ment stimulate even larger-scale organizations among workers.
The greater the fraction of the country's business in the hands
of such aggregations, the less flexible does the price system
26
become. Negotiations over prices and wage rates between two
or several great interests arecarried on in elaborately organized
and time-consuming conferences. They are entrusted to agents
whose credit depends upon getting favorable terms fortheir
side in a controversy—men whose attention is likely tobecome
so centered upon thesingle issue of prices or wage rates that
they neglect the effect of high prices and wage rates uponvol-
ume. The net effect is oftenloss to both parties, and their loss
reacts unfavorably upon thewhole economy.
How difficulties of this sort can be obviated withinthe
framework of free enterprise is one of the issues that has regis-
tered in the public consciousness. Past efforts to breakdown
monopolies have not given reassurance. Few are ready to sur-
render the advantages of large-scale production. Nor do many
challenge the right of workers to combine in large unions. But
many, including men ofaffairs and labor leaders, acknowledge,
in private if not in public, the dangers to the commonwelfare
inherent in this situation. And these dangers threaten to be-
come graver after the war,unless we face them more intelli-
gently and more dispassionately than we have done hitherto.
What the National Bureau can contribute toward resolving
this formidable dilemma is to publish its findings concerning
the relations among prices, sales, and profits; wage-rates, em-
ployment, and wage-earners' incomes. On the first head, an
integration of findings by the Conferences on Price Research
and Financial Research may prove highly significant; but that
integration has not yet been made. One shift proposed in our
program is to bring these twolines of investigation into focus
upon the effects of different pricepolicies on sales, profits, pro-
duction, and national income; also the reactions of changes in
national income upon sales, prices, and profits.
Meanwhile the Conference on Price Research has set up a
Committee on Price Determination under the Co-chairman-
ship of T. 0. Yntema and Joel Dean to investigate price-
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27making processes. The contacts they have established with
industrial and commercial establishments in the Chicago area
will be utilized in a field study of the manner in which price
controls are applied, and of their economic consequences. Such
a study, conducted by anon-governmental agency, should sup-
plement the appraisals of price control that may be made by
the federal Office of Price Administration.
On the second head, Mr. Wolman has already in hand a
considerable body of materials that merit the thoughtful atten-
tion of public officials, labor leaders, and employers. What
seems called for again is speeding up publication withoutwait-
ing until the investigation can be completed.
Production and Productivity
Pertinent to both war and postwar problems are the researches
into production and productivity that Solomon Fabricant and
Harold Barger are in process of finishing. This work, made
possible by grants from the Maurice and Laura Falk Founda-
tion, complements and checks estimates of national income on
one side, and on another supplements andre-enforces conclu-
sions based upon wage rates, employment, and payroll dis-
bursements.
In The Output of Manufacturing industries, 1899-1937,
Mr.Fabricant demonstrated that manufacturing output has
grown decidedly faster in the last forty years than was indi-
cated by indexes of production compiled from unchanging
lists of commodities that can be counted in physical units, and
his work has contributed to the improvement of such indexes,
notably the one compiled by the Federal Reserve Board.
Mr. Barger's parallel studies of agriculture, mining and quar-
rying, and public utilities raise to a higher level our knowledge
of the additions these branches of production severally make to
real income.
As Messrs. Fabricant and Barger studied the records for
thcsc industries, in which output was usually pushed up more
by increasing productivity than by. rising employment, they
realized that they could not really understand the develop-
ment of these segments of our economy without also learning
something about certain industries into which employment has
been rapidly pouring—those which produce services instead of
commodities. These industries, including such diverse activi-
ties as trade, domestic service, amusement, the medical profes-
sions, engineering, and government, catering both to consumers
and to business concerns, have steadily increased in size, and
before the present war employed some 35 per cent of all gain-
fully occupied persons. The study of incomes in five profes-
sions by Simon Kuznets and Milton Friedman illuminates one
portion of this field; the other parts also should be brought into
the light. When production is once more carried on primarily
for civilian needs, the service industries will enter prominently
into the calculations of those concerned with the employment
of workers released from war industries. But as yet we have
only vague impressions about how much of the expected slack
in employment these industries can take up. When they have
finished their current studies of production and productivity,
our two investigators will be well equipped •to attack this
question.
Meanwhile they have drawn significant conclusions regard-
ing productivity. We often overlook the obvious fact that our
average standard of living cannot rise except as we, the workers,
increase average output per man of the goods we buy as con-
sumers. If average productivity did not rise, the best we could
attain would be a national income that grows only as fast as the
number of producers. Besides bringing home this fundamental
piece of common sense, the detailed examination of employ-
ment, output, and productivity in over a hundred branches of
manufacturing exhibits an arresting relationship between out-
put per worker and industrial growth. Those industries in
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29which the increase in outputper worker has been rapid are
usually industries in which the number of workershas risen
rapidly, in which totalwage disbursements have expanded
vigorously, and in which the annual incomes ofthe employees
seem to have been high. Conversely, industries that have
lagged in output per worker have been usuallythose in which
employment declined, totalwage disbursements contracted,
and annual incomes (thoughnot in all instances wage rates)
seem to have been low. Probably these conclusions might be
restated in terms of profits realizedor losses incurred, and
capital Thus the common interest of the nation in
attaining higher efficiency in production isalso, as a rule, the
individual interest of its citizens,no matter what industry they
are attached to. True it is that many an individual gains byget-
ting a higher price per unit for whateverhe has to sell;but
those individuals have made thegreatest gains on the average
who have increased their output of goodsthat others desire,
and at the same time havecut costs arid prices. It is only these
producers who have augmented thecommon welfare.
ECONOMIC BALANCE WITHIN THE AMERICANECONOMY
These complacent remarks require qualification.An industry
can overstock its market, drive its selling prices belowcosts,
• bankrupt its business enterprises, andthrow its whole working
staff on the streets. Justas the question what wage rates or
prices are 'too' high turns on their relationto other parts of the
price system, so the question of what is'overproduction' turns
on the relation between output in a given industry andoutput
in other parts of the industrialsystem. One of the critical points
in business management isto find what rate of output is most
profitable at any given time in view ofthe unit costs and selling
prices of the products. So, too,one of the critkal points in de-
termining the prosperityor depression of a nation both from
year to year and in the long run is the balanceor lack of bal-
30
alice itmaintains among the many activities thatconstitute its
economy.
These reflections are whetted to acutting edge by observing
the fortunes and misfortunesof agriculture since the preced—
ing war. Its checkered career mayhave occurred to the reader
ascontradicting what was said about theclose association
between the productivityand the prosperity of individual
branches of production. In afuller sense than is commonly
realized, American farming ranks amongthe progressive in-
dustries. Mr. Barger showssubstantial increases since 1899
in average output per man inboth vegetable and animal hus-
bandry. Yet in farmers suffered exceedingly hard
times. And, 'because of thepeculiar organization of farming,
hard times applied pressure to getstill larger output; that
reduced prices further, and made timesstill harder. It was not
until the federal government regretfullyintroduced the policy
of restricting output, and obtained thereluctant acceptance of
this policy by paying farmers not toproduce, that the fortunes
of American agriculture looked up.
This episode does not mean that, even inthe eyes of the offi-
cials who inaugurated restriction of output,restriction is desir-
able except as a desperate remedy for an acutedisorder. It does,
however, in the most emphatic fashion oneof the diffi-
culties characteristic of our age----adifficulty that is now com-
plicating the effort to avoid aprice.inflation, and a difficulty
that threatens to become chronic in postwar years.
When the producers of a nation getorganized in powerful
'blocs', each seeking to retain and ifpossible to enlarge its
share in the common product,attention is centered upon the
terms of interchange. Theobvious way to increase the share
of any bloc is to put higher unit prices uponwhat it sells. The
easiest way to raise prices is to reduce supply.Then the struggle
over the divisionof the common product turns into ascramble
to cut output, the endof which is less to share among the con-
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When the producers of a nation getorganized in powerful
'blocs', each seeking to retain and ifpossible to enlarge its
share in the common product,attention is centered upon the
terms of interchange. Theobvious way to increase the share
of any bloc is to put higher unit prices uponwhat it sells. The
easiest way to raise prices is to reduce supply.Then the struggle
over the divisionof the common product turns into ascramble
to cut output, the endof which is less to share among the con-
3'testing parties, and a decline in public wellbeing. Farmers, or-
ganized in such a bloc, were enabled to adopt the tactics of
block warfare, and to increase their net returns.
This purposefully over-simplified statement does not repre-
sent accurately the current state of affairs; but it does represent
a possible result of one among the salient trends in economic
evolution. The formation of economic blocs began in those
branches of industry in which operating conditions made efli-
ciency depend upon unified control over large enterprises.
Railways were the earliest example to excite widespread con-
cern in this country, but other public utilities followed hard
on their heels, and then industries exploiting natural resources
so limited that the richest properties could be readily con-
trolled. The movement spread to branches of business in which
a quasi-monopoly could be obtained by other means, for ex-
ample, exclusive patents, secret agreements between nominal
competitors, or great size. Partly in self-defense, partly in the
hope of getting for themselves the advantages of monopolistic
position, other interests imitated their example. The struggle
was carried into politics. Powerful business enterprises resorted
at times to meretricious propaganda and bribery to get special
favors from governments, local, state, and national. Groups
otherwise weak but strong at the polls by virtue of numbers
brought pressure to bear upon their representatives. In conse-
quence, the formation of blocs was promoted by the common
agency for protecting public welfare, and the most extraor-
dinary achievements in this direction have been due to its
efforts. The process is self-reinforcing. Interests that cannot
or will not join in the process of organizing for self-defense
or aggression run the risk of being exploited on all sides.
The recital of those familiar developments takes us back to
what was said in an earlier section about the declining flexibility
of wage rates and prices. It is not by chance that the two ap-
proaches bring up the same issue. And this issue is so grave that
we should examine it closely from both angles,.
In an economy where production is carried on predominantly
by relatively small units, the balance among industries is main-
tained or restored after an upset mainly by price adjustments.
If the output of a given trade is 'too' large in relation to that
of others, the prices of its products fall, profits disappear, and
supply is restricted. If the output is 'too' small in relation to
the general scale of operations, prices rise, profits swell, and
the supply is enlarged. When prices become inflexible this
mechanism ceases to work efficiently. Then readjustments
among branches of industry are made mainly by changesin out-
put. This condition aggravates fluctuations in employment,
in national income, and in economic welfare. Also, as has been
said, concentration upon efforts to avoid price cuts gives the
changes in production a bias toward restriction.
How the necessary balance among economic activities can
be maintained on a high level of operations in a system domi-
nated by blocs, each of which strives to bend governments to
its purposes, may become the crux of postwar debates. The
National Bureau can raise such discussions to a higher level if
it pushes forward its studies in prices, wages, production, pro-
ductivity, capital formation, national income, and business
cycles. Ought it attempt more than that by trying to weave its
own findings, together with other materials, into ananalysis
of the secular trend toward organization in blocs, the role
played by different factors (induding government) in that
process, its effects upon the balance of the economy, devicesfor
maintaining balance that have been substituted for price
changes, and an exploration of alternatives to present policies,
so far as policies can be made out and alternatives imagined?
Exceedingly ambitious, such an undertaking would require
a rare combination of insight with judgment, as well as much
industry in gathering materials. It might be difficult under
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32 I 33the conditions we now face to keep personnel qualified to direct
the project, to do the spade work, and to devise analytic
methods that would wring significant conclusions from the di-
verse data and speculations to be canvassed. No doubt the
National Bureau would be better equipped for the task after
it had carried its current investigations further, and when it
could be sure of enlisting and keeping a larger staff. But the
likelihood that the country may have tograsp at some hasty
solution soon after the war renders it incumbentupon us to
consider whether we should notnow embark upon this haz-
ardous venture with the inadequatemeans at our command.
ECONOMIC BALANCE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
A similar and yet more difficult problem is presented by the
economic relations of the United States to other countries. The
effects upon our domestic activities produced by the growth
of blocs jockeying for advantageover one another are roughly
paralleled by the effects produced in the family of nations by
the rise of 'autarchies'.
Our country's share in these developments has been widely
influential, not because of the extremes to which it has carried
economic isolation, but because of its great wealth. By tradi-
tion reaching back to the Civil War if not beyond, wewere
committed to the 'protection of home industries'. The effects
of high import duties uponour economic development were
a perennial subject of academic debate and of political struggle.
Despite the opposition of critics able andnumerous, tariff rates
rose decade by decade. We entered the 'First World War' a
leading exponent of 'protection', and,a majority of Amer-
icans thought, the brightest example of its merits.
Whatever view is taken of the net gainsor losses to the
United States from its tariff policy up to r917, the issue entered
a new phase as the country shifted from its old position as a
'debtor nation' to its new positionas the world's leading
'creditor nation'. Understanding of how this momentous shift
bore upon the tariff issue gained ground too slowly to bring a
thorough reconsideration of our policy. The country tried to
collect sums due it on trade balances and on war accounts; at
the same time it built higher its barriers against payment in
goods.
This policy encouraged, and in part forced, other countries
to adopt measures more extreme. The game of commercial
strategy as played on the international stage in the 1920's, and
still more in the 1930's, led to a drastic shrinkage in the world
marketing of goods, a consequent drop in the production of
wealth, and mutual frustration. It is easy to see that some
countries suffered more than others from this process, and that
some industries in the United States suffered more than others.
Off—hand it is hard to see what industry or what country was
genuinely benefited.
When peace comes again to the world, what benefits it brings
to the nations will be determined in large measure.by their
readiness to cooperate with one another in promoting economic
welfare. The terms of cooperation will depend upon engage-
ments into which governments enter during the struggle, as
well as upon the military settlement. While there is no fore-
casting such matters, it is desirable to consider what line of
economic policy toward other nations the United States should
adopt if conditions enable it to choose freely. If a little of the
clarity that comes with hindsight can be imparted to our fore-
sight in such matters, there may be fewer future regrets than
intelligent Americans now feel as they look back upon the era
of reconstruction that began in 1919.
Thus the need is clear for searching and impartial inquiry
into the consequences of the economic policies followed by lead-
ing nations toward one another from 1919 to 1940. But the
difficulties of such an undertaking, even if it were restricted to
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I 35the United States, are formidable indeed. No economic theme
has a more controversial history, and the clash of opposing
interests is as fierce now as ever it was. In no field is it harder
to judge the relative importance of the many factors involved.
The quantity and variety of materials that should be canvassed
is very great. Part of them can be found only in governmental
bureaus; yet any governmental inquiry would be suspected of
partisan bias at home and of national bias abroad. Only a
thorough study on a factual basis would carry conviction; an
adequate staff of the high qualifications required would be
especially hard to recruit and hold under current conditions;
the cost in money would be high. Yet the need is there and
some organization should promptly set about filling it; for the
job will require several years, and the results should be avail-
able when the war ends, or soon thereafter.
The National Bureau has not proper qualifications for this
undertaking. We have had a little experience in dealing with
international questions, but not much. We do not offer advice
upon matters of policy, aside from technical matters concern-
ing statistical data. Though this limitation is self-imposed, we
think it should be maintained in the interest of our future use-
fulness to the public. Our financial resources do not suffice for
large additional commitments, and we must live up to the
obligations we have already assumed. But in reviewing current
needs for economic research, we should not omit the problem
of international trade and finance. It is our hope that some
body better qualified than the National Bureau will assume
this responsibility. If it does, we shall gladly put at its disposal
our not inconsiderable collection of international data, and aid
it in any other way that we can. If no other agency is willing
and able to take the lead, it will become the duty of the Na-
tional Bureau to consider whether, despite all difficulties, it
should march into the breach.
36
Financial Research
Last autumn, the directors of ourFinancial Research Program,
in consultation with representativesof the Association of Re-
serve City Bankers, recasttheir plans to bear more directly
upon pressing currentquestions. One general result was to sug-
gest a flexible procedure thatwill enable our rather elaborate
organization to effect future changesof more quickly.
Besides issuing promptly the general summaryof its thor-
ough studies of consumer installmentfinancing, completing
the investigation of businessfinancing, and putting the great
collection of data gathered by the CorporateBond Project in
form for practical uses, the Committee onResearch in Finance
has been mapping territory thatneeds to be explored. It has
approved the following areas of work: Theimpact of the war
(i) on bank lending activities, (2.) onthe financial structure
of business enterprises, and onbank investment portfolios;
theplace of equity financing in war and postwarcapital
problems; (5) private international investmentafter the war;
(6) selective credit control in currentand postwar central
banking policy. In view of the wealthof materials assembled
during the past two years in connectionwith the Business Fi-
nancing Project, the Committeerecommends that attention
be focused next upon the first two areas.
Those in touch with recent developmentsrealize that the
country's financial machinery is anindispensable part of our
equipment for mobilizing its economic resources,and for ef-
fecting the turnover from productionfor peace to production
for war, and back again to peace. The banksand other financial
agencies have to do their share in this greatundertaking when
nearly all factors involved in theircalculations are shifting
from day to day. Requirements, burdens,and risks are in-
fluenced by war contracts for finished goods, warinvestments
in plant, tax laws, governmental borrowings, monetarypolicies,
attempts to control prices,difficulties in obtaining raw materials
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The National Bureau has not proper qualifications for this
undertaking. We have had a little experience in dealing with
international questions, but not much. We do not offer advice
upon matters of policy, aside from technical matters concern-
ing statistical data. Though this limitation is self-imposed, we
think it should be maintained in the interest of our future use-
fulness to the public. Our financial resources do not suffice for
large additional commitments, and we must live up to the
obligations we have already assumed. But in reviewing current
needs for economic research, we should not omit the problem
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Financial Research
Last autumn, the directors of ourFinancial Research Program,
in consultation with representativesof the Association of Re-
serve City Bankers, recasttheir plans to bear more directly
upon pressing currentquestions. One general result was to sug-
gest a flexible procedure thatwill enable our rather elaborate
organization to effect future changesof more quickly.
Besides issuing promptly the general summaryof its thor-
ough studies of consumer installmentfinancing, completing
the investigation of businessfinancing, and putting the great
collection of data gathered by the CorporateBond Project in
form for practical uses, the Committee onResearch in Finance
has been mapping territory thatneeds to be explored. It has
approved the following areas of work: Theimpact of the war
(i) on bank lending activities, (2.) onthe financial structure
of business enterprises, and onbank investment portfolios;
theplace of equity financing in war and postwarcapital
problems; (5) private international investmentafter the war;
(6) selective credit control in currentand postwar central
banking policy. In view of the wealthof materials assembled
during the past two years in connectionwith the Business Fi-
nancing Project, the Committeerecommends that attention
be focused next upon the first two areas.
Those in touch with recent developmentsrealize that the
country's financial machinery is anindispensable part of our
equipment for mobilizing its economic resources,and for ef-
fecting the turnover from productionfor peace to production
for war, and back again to peace. The banksand other financial
agencies have to do their share in this greatundertaking when
nearly all factors involved in theircalculations are shifting
from day to day. Requirements, burdens,and risks are in-
fluenced by war contracts for finished goods, warinvestments
in plant, tax laws, governmental borrowings, monetarypolicies,
attempts to control prices,difficulties in obtaining raw materials
37from foreign or domestic sources, priorities, the uncertainties
of foreign exchange rates, and countless other matters. The
prospect of postwar days is even fuller of uncertainties. If we
continue the mixture of private enterprise and governmental
intervention when peace returns, the financial sector of our
business system will have a heavy load indeed put upon it, and
will need more than ever all the insight that research into cur-
rent conditions can add to the acumen and judgment acquired
in practice. Thus there is a compelling argument for continuing
as best we can the financial research part of our program during
the war.
Fiscal Research
Even more obvious is the justification for current study of
fiscal problems. Never has the country assumed such a tax load
as is now contemplated, never have its expenditures approxi-
mated the present estimates, and never has it piled up public
debt at such a rate. All the issues of public finance, as they affect
private citizens, business enterprises, and the federal govern-
ment have risen to a higher order of importance, and the re-
actions of wise or unwise policies upon the national welfare
have become more drastic. The field offers better opportunities
for research than many branches of economics, and financial
officials are eager to use genuine contributions to knowledge.
Certain parts of the comparison between definitions of busi-
ness income by taxing authorities and definitions for other pur-
poses, made by the Conference on Research in Fiscal Policy,
have already been furnished to the Treasury and the Securities
Exchange Commission. Despite delays caused by withdrawals
of staff into governmental service, the work is well advanced
and should be finished by spring.
Early last year the Carnegie Corporation granted funds that
enabled the Conference to undertake a survey of defense
financing, which circumstances turned into a Study of Defense
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and War Financing. Byenlisting a staff of experts,the direct-
ing committee (W.L. Crum, JohnFennelly, and Lawrence
Seltzer) were able to get apreliminary draft ready forcritical
discussion by a group of somethirty specialists andDirectors
of the National Bureau onFebruary 7 and 8.
This substantial manuscriptpoints out that the basicrequire-
ments for victory aretrained men in large numbersand enor-
mous quantitiesof equipment. To obtainthe equipment in
adequate amount, theflatioz'I must depend mainly uponincreas-
ing its gross outputby fuller use of its laborand capital, and
upon diverting to waruses asubstantial part of the energy
normally put into supplying consumers.In a money economy
these changes take onprevailingly a monetary guise.The gov-
ernment must pay the menit drafts and employs;it must buy
the supplies it requires, or paymen to makethem in its own
arsenals and new plants thatit may acquire or build.But there
is grave danger that thehuge governmentalspending incident
to this programwill defeat the secondessential shift in its
activities—namely, the diversionof production from civilian
goods to war goods. For theseexpenditures tend to increase
the disbursementsof wages and dividends, thedemand for
consumers' goods, their prices,and so the energy put into
supplying a highly profitabledemand. To avert this conse-
quence islogically quite as much anaim of current fiscal
policy as securing enough moneyfrom taxes and loans to pay
for the war.
Consideration of this problemcalls for study first of the way
in which the war will changethe volume and distributionof
consumers' incomes, secondof various direct controls over pro-
duction, and third of the wayin which taxes and loansof various
kinds affect consumers'expenditures and react uponprices.
Any systematic treatmentby competent handsof these fun-
damental issues in war financingshould be of great value to
the legislators andadministrators who must soon cometo a
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39series of decisions upon federal policy. Theirtime is short and
they are burdened with other responsibilities.In view of their
needs, the Directors of the National Bureauvoted at the annual
meeting that the manuscript of the Studyof Defense and War
Financing may be put at the disposal ofpublic men whocare
to see it while still in process, and before it hasbeen reviewed
in our standard fashion. What formthe report will finally
assume, and what disposition will be made of itare questions
for the months tocome.
National Income
Though estimates of national incomeare now being widely
used in Washington, bothas guides to over-all planning and in
numberless detailed operations, andthough these practical
uses are revealing the limitatibns as wellas values of the data,
those best acquainted with the fielddoubt that any elaborate
new ventures should be started during thewar. This doubt
affects the planning ofour Conference on Research in Income
and Wealth, which inrecent years has devoted much of its
energy to stimulating the collection and analysis ofdata upon
the distribution of income by size,particularly in the lower
brackets. As noted in Part Two,gratifying progress has been
made, but much remainsto be done before a satisfactory series
of estimates covering the wholerange of individual and family
incomes can be prepared in such formthat a public agencycan
undertake the preparation ofcomparable figures for future
years.
The second function of the IncomeConference, that ofpro-
viding a forum and stimulus fortechnical discussions, should
be continued if possible. TheConference has proved its value
to the country beyond question, andpromises to render further
services. We cannot besure, however, that the annual meetings
will not be interrupted, formany members may be too busy
with war work toprepare papers.
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Four members of the NationalBureau's Income Unit are
already in governmental employ. Thisshifting of staff will,
of course, restrict our activity in the nearfuture, and will also
influence the direction of what work we canattempt. Pre-
sumably what had been the chief item in our pre-warprogram
—completing the second volume ofCommodity Flow and
Capital Foimation—must yield to morepressing tasks.
What we should attempt is stillundetermined, but three
suggestions seem promising at present.(x) A study of the
country's potential capacity forproduction that can be diverted
to military uses. This venturewould supplement Mr. Kuznets'
Occasional Paper referred to above, itwould involve estimat-
mg the total outputthat can be achieved by the countryduring
the war years, and the minimum sumsthat must be devoted to
civilian consumption and non-warcapital requirements. Doubt-
less one or more governmental agencieshave been putting to-
gether figures of this sort, but we thinkthat our staff can make
a contributionof substantial value. Astudy of the changes
in the volume and composition of thenational income in 1938-
41,anda comparisonof these changes with thoseoccurring
in 1914-18.(3)Changes in the national incomeand its com-
ponents after the First WorldWar. These three studies are
not conceived as elaborateinvestigations, but as assemblies and
analyses of easily available data, summed upin concise reports
that can be prepared rather quickly.
THE PARAMOUNT DUTY OF THEDAY
All the foregoing is predicated on theassumption that the
National Bureau can best serve thenation's interests by con-
tinuing to work, with such of its staff as are nottaken into the
armed forces or governmental offices, uponproblems that are
of immediate urgency or will becomepressing when peace
returns. But is thisassumption valid? The studiesreviewed
above would not be of much value toAmericans if they lost
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41their power to shape theirown institutions, to carryon their
lives as theysee fit. They must win the war beforethey can
essay the task of building a better world forthemselves and
other peoples. That is theperemptory call that all individuals
and all organizations shouldanswer to the best of their ability.
If it develops that the NationalBureau can render important
war service, the Executive Committee ofthe Directors will
have to consider whatparts of the program they haveapproved
and would like tosee executed shall be dropped. Thatno such
duty has yet been laidupon us may not mean thatnone will be.
No group not in the thickof war planning andintimately
acquainted with its rapidlyshifting exigenciescan be a good
judge of current requirements.But members ofour Board and
staff now in Washington,as well as numerous officials who have
gained acquaintance withour resources as members ofour
Conferences or as readers ofour publications, may atany time
ask the National Bureauto undertake some task it is fittedto
perform. So far, therequests that have been madeare for the
services of individualsworking with us. Howmany of our
staff and collaborators havealready givenup their researches
in whole or inpart for governmental service isshown in the
third section. It is themore likely that future callsupon us
will be of this sort becauseof the obvious difficultiesof using
an outside agency to good advantagein efforts thatmust be
closely coordinated andthat demand quick decisions.
It is also pointedout above that the federalgovernment
itself is taking thought ofprobable postwar conditionsand de-
voting part of its personnelto devising future plans. Thisfact
is reassuring,not only as a sign of prudent foresight,but also
as an indication that notevery shred of the country's intelli-
gence must be spent upon today's problem.The situation would
be desperate indeed ifno attention could be paidto tomorrow's
needs. If the responsible officialswho know most about thehard
days ahead feel justifiedin continuing their forwardplanning,
a private research agencyshould perform the tasks for which
it was created until it is assigned war duties, oruntil its whole
staff has been drawn into war work.
This conclusion was reached by the ExecutiveCommittee of
the Board at its meeting on the i6th oflast December. The
function of economic research in general and of theNational
Bureau in particular was discussed at some length,and the con—
sensus of opinion wasformally recorded as follows:
Economic research is a function equally importantin
war and in peace.
In so far as possible, the National Bureaushould be kept
intact as a going concern.
3) Its program should bepushed energetically, because
much of it bears directly upon war problems, andall parts will•
contribute to the understanding and handling ofproblems of
economic re-adjustment after the war.
4) Whenever the National Bureau canaid in the emergency
by adjusting or expediting its work, it should make everyeffort
to do so.
Itshould help and encourage members of its staffs to par-
ticipate in the public services wherever and whenever itis clear
that an opportunity exists for constructive contributions.
WESLEY C. MITCHELL
DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH
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